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In  the  latter  part  of  June,  I  was  still  on  the  other  side  of  the
Atlantic.  When,  in  May,  I  had  left  Washington,  the  first  ominous
tents  of the  March  of  the  Poor  were  being  set up.  In  Europe,  mili-
tant  actions  of  students  were  erupting  in  Belgium,  Britain,  Western
Germany,  and  France.  Strikebound  rail  and  air  transportation,  the
resulting  paralysis  of  major  industries,  and the  general  revolt  threat-
ened  to end  De  Gaulle's  regime.  However,  by mid-June,  all  this had
subsided,  and  life  on  the  Continent  had  returned  to  almost normal,
while  the  assassination  of  Robert  Kennedy-the  second  murder  of
a  political  leader  within  a  few months-shocked  the  world.  In Lon-
don,  on  the  first  of  July,  with  the  subway  closed  to  its  seven  and  a
half  million  inhabitants,  a  slowdown  on  railways,  and  BOAC  shut
down by  a pilot strike,  everything  was  more  pleasantly  quiet  and or-
derly  than  I  have  ever  seen  it.  And  when,  on  the Fourth  of  July,  I
left  Washington,  our  entire  capital  was  also  as  pleasantly  peaceful,
flag-decorated,  and orderly  as I have  ever  seen  it.
These  are  only  a  few  of the  intriguing  manifestations  of political,
social,  and  economic  conditions  that  came  to  my  mind  when  I  re-
ceived  the  invitation  to reassess  the course  of our  foreign  and domes-
tic policies.
During  the  three  decades  behind  us,  the  range  of  the  course  of
major  events  has never  seemed  so  appallingly  wide  as  it  does today,
nor  has  there  been  such  explosive  discontent,  insurrection,  and  vio-
lent  mob  psychosis  in  congested  city  areas.  The  enormous  progress
of  scientific  research,  invention,  and  business,  and  the  resulting  ex-
pansion  of  resources  available  to  man  in  organized  society,  have
opened  a multitude  of new alternative  courses  of  action  and reduced
the  time  needed  to  achieve  certain ends.  That  goes  for ourselves,  our
friends,  and  our  enemies,  and  it  applies  to  no  other  human  action
more  specifically  than to agriculture  and the production and  distribu-
tion of  food,  feed,  and fiber.
Therefore,  a note  of caution is  required concerning  this appraisal
as  of  September  1968.  Any  pertinent  facts  or  events  that  become
known  hereafter  may  call  for  an  adjustment  of  the  conclusions
reached.
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than  the growth  in  resources  and  technology  are  the  waves  of  social,
political,  and  ideological  movements,  which  have  come  to  the  fore
since  the  Korean  War.  They  range  from  world-wide  neo-Marxian
class  struggle  to racial  combat  and militant nationalism  via any  num-
ber  of  economic  or  political  pressure  groups,  on  the  one  side,  to
overcautious  nonintervention,  hopeful  detente,  pacifism,  and  a  search
for  world government  Utopias,  on the  other.
While  all  such  movements  are  neither  unique  nor  basically  new
in  history,  their latest  virulent  appearance  has  created  new problems
for  the  legislative  and  executive  branches  of  representative  govern-
ment  everywhere.
WORLD  OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES
Before  charting  the  course  of  our  nation's  policies,  it  is  manda-
tory,  to  demark  as  clearly  as  possible  our  position  relative  to  other
inhabited  parts  of  our planet  in  1968.
The  United  States  emerged  from  World  War  II  as  the  leading
economic  and  military  power  among  nations.  By  virtue  of her  gross
national  product,  the  capacity  of  her  basic  industrial,  agricultural,
and  commercial  plants,  her  energy  resources,  and  the  skills  of  her
labor  force,  she  has no  peer  among  nations.
The  nation that ranks  second  among  the world's  powers  is  Soviet
Russia.  Her  industrial  capacity,  her  gross  national  product,  and  her
rate  of economic  growth put her into  that  position.
The  economic  geography  positions  of  both  powers  show  the
greatest  contrasts:
I.  Our  nation,  stretching  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  and
from  the  Mexican  Gulf to  Canada  and  Alaska,  was,  is,  and  will be,
first and  last,  a naval  power.  From  her  beginning  as  a  raw  materials
exporting colony of naval powers she has depended  on freedom of the
seven  seas  and  access  of her merchant  ships to the ports  of the  world.
Entry into  World  War  I  and World  War II was  actually precipitated
by  the  imminent  danger  that  a  hostile power  would  jeopardize  free-
dom  of  the  seas  and  access  to  foreign  ports  and  would  get  control
over  the  world's  leading  shipyards.  The  rise  of  air  transportation,
atomic  power,  and  rockets  has  not  changed  this.  With  the  elimina-
tion  of Japanese  naval  power  and  the  decline  of British  and French
naval  power,  the  United  States  became  the  leading  naval  power  of
the  world  and  the  protector  of  freedom  of  sea  transport  for  all  na-
tions  outside  the  Soviet  orbit.
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herent  land  mass  on  the  Eurasian  Continent,  stretching  from  central
Poland  to  the  Behring  Straits  and  Vladivostok.  This  "Heartland"
has,  so  far,  proven  itself  militarily  unconquerable  and  strategically
strong.  Yet,  the  weaknesses  of its  economic  geography  are:  the enor-
mous  distance  from  the  Ural  Mountains  through  the  Siberian  waste-
lands  to  the  mineral  wealth  of the  Far  East,  the  slope  of Asia  rising
from  subarctic  sea  level  in  the  north  to  the  east-west  barrier  of  the
world's  highest  mountains,  and  the  absence  of  ice-free  seaports  in
Europe.
With  a  centrally  managed,  autarchic  economic  system  and  tight
control  over  dependent  satellite  states,  Soviet  Russia  sits  behind  a
self-built  electrified  barbed  wire  fence  and  minefield  that  reaches
from  the  western  end  of  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea.  With  icy  cool
nerves  and  concentration,  she  plays  a  number  of  simultaneous  legal
and  diplomatic  chess  games  to  win  territorial  expansion  of strategic
areas  in  the  west  and  southwest,  and  in  the  Far  East.  One  of  her
priority  goals  is  control  over  more  first-class  seaports  and  well-devel-
oped  industrial  capacities  in contested  areas.
Soviet  Russia  already  has  an  extraordinarily  large  array  of  ar-
mored  divisions  and  up-to-date  air force  and  ballistic  missiles  of in-
tercontinental  range  as  well  as  satellites  and  commitment  of  major
financial  resources  to  research  on manned  stations  in  astro space.
Added  to  all  this  is  the  rapid  growth  of Soviet  naval power.  The
U.S.S.R.  has  four  separate  fleets-one  each  for  the  Baltic  Sea,  the
Black  and  Mediterranian  Seas,  the  Arctic,  and  the  Far  East.  This
rapidly  growing  navy  is  comprised  of  hundreds  of  vessels  including
fast new cruisers with  surface-to-surface  rockets,  antiaircraft  artillery,
and  helicopters,  and  fast  nuclear  submarines  with  longest  range,  a
marine  corps,  and  a  merchant  marine  including  oil  and  liquid  gas
tankers  with  capacities  from 200,000  to 500,000  tons each.
III.  Since  1945  Soviet  Russia  has  extended  her  political,  eco-
nomic,  and  military control westwards  at sea  in  the Baltic  and along
the  Norwegian  coast  and  on land  and  in  the air from  Leningrad  al-
most to  Copenhagen,  Hamburg, Goettingen,  and Vienna.
Ever  since  the  Korean  War the  partnership  between  the United
States  and her Western  and  Southeast  Asian  allies has  weakened  and
become  more problematic.  Liquidation  of the British Commonwealth
and  the  French  positions  in  Indochina,  the Near  East,  and  Africa,
the  hasty  retreat  of  Belgium  from  Africa,  the  refusal  of  Britain  to
join  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  and  competition  among  the  Six  of  the
European  Economic  Community  and  the  Customs  Union  of  the
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North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  which  expires  within  less  than
a year.  Having  helped  in rebuilding  Western  Europe  under  the  Mar-
shall Plan,  the  United  States  has  carried  the main  burden  of  all mili-
tary  conflicts  ever  since  Teheran,  Yalta,  and  Potsdam.
The  British  navy  has  disengaged  itself  from  its  commitments  in
Southeast  Asia,  which  is  threatened  by  Communist  aggression  by
proxy,  leaving  the  defense  of freedom  of  the  seas  and  open  passage
through  the  straits  and  the  ports  to  our  seventh  fleet.  The  British
navy  has  also  withdrawn  from  the  entire  Mediterranean,  as  has  the
French  fleet.  France  abandoned  last  February  the  strategic  triangle
of  her  naval  bases  Toulon-Oran  (Mers-el-Kebir)-Bizerte,  substitut-
ing  Brest  at  the  Atlantic  coast  for  it,  while  Algeria  let  the  Soviet
Black  Sea  fleet  and  other  Soviet  naval  units  use  Mers-el-Kebir  as
their naval  base.  Only  our sixth  fleet  remains  to protect  the  freedom
of  the  air  and sea  against piracy  or aggression  from  the  war torn  oil
and gas rich Middle  East  and  Israel  all  the way  to Malta  and Spain's
Costa  Brava.  With  Soviet  submarines  before  Gibraltar,  the  "soft
underbelly"  of  Western  Europe  is  more  exposed  than  at  any  time
since  1941.
Following  the  Geneva  Accords  of  1954  and  1962,  we  have  been
engaged  for  years  in  the  war  in  Vietnam,  10,000  miles  from  our
shores.  We  are  defending  the  South  Vietnamese  against  aggression
and  conquest  by  the  Communists  of  North  Vietnam,  whose  armed
forces  are endorsed,  fed,  and  equipped  by Soviet  Russia.  This  is,  es-
sentially,  what we did under the Truman Doctrine in Greece,  Turkey,
Lebanon,  Korea,  and  Taiwan.  But  the  real  and  perfectly  valid  po-
litical  and  economic  reason  why  we  are  supporting  our  diplomatic
action  with  military  force  goes  far  beyond  the  fertile  swamp  which
the  French  settled  and  colonized.  In  defense  of  legitimate  national
self-interest  we  are  putting  teeth  into  the international  law  concern-
ing freedom  of the  sea, peaceful  foreign  trade,  economic cooperation,
and freedom  of access  to ports from Alaska to Madagascar-with  the
Tonkin  Straits and  the Straits of Malacca  as  most critical passages.
At  stake  is  the  political,  economic,  and  social  independence  of
Burma, Cambodia,  Thailand,  South Vietnam,  South Korea,  Malaysia,
Indonesia,  the Philippines,  and Taiwan.  The danger is  the  absorption,
by savage guerrilla warfare  and terror by proxy, of the civilian popula-
tion  of  all  those  countries  into  the  Communist  alliance  that  is  com-
mitted to deadly hostility  to everything  we and the  West stand  for.
IV.  The  most  menacing  contingency  of  our  political-economic-
military  engagement  in  Southeast  Asia  is  the  precarious  position  of
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third  after  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  With  nearly  100  mil-
lion hard-working  well-disciplined  people  this nation  leads  in mining,
deep-sea  fishing,  production  of  steel  and  small  farm  machinery  and
implements,  and petrochemical,  electronic,  and numerous  other  man-
ufactures.  But,  according  to  her  constitution,  this  gifted,  seafaring,
island-inhabiting  nation  can  provide  no national  defense  of her  own
and,  after  the  loss  of all  former  colonies  as  well  as  important islands
of her own,  must "export  or die."  Aside from  close  economic  cooper-
ation  with  us  and  the  leading  industrial  countries  of the  West,  there
is  no other  protection  against shrewdly  manipulated-or  even  force-
ful-incorporation  of Japan's  resources  into  the U.S.S.R.'s  political,
economic,  and  military  orbit  of power  than  the  ever  alert  and  ever
visible  striking  force  of  our  seventh  fleet  and  the  fulfillment  of  our
commitment  to Japan,  South Korea,  and  South Vietnam.
This  fulfillment  of  our  commitment,  which  involves  such  tragic
loss  of  lives  of  our  soldiers,  amounts  to  the  fulfillment  of the  duty
we  owe  to our people,  our  right to  survive,  and our  great  cause  as  a
nation.
To  round  up  my  appraisal  of  major  foreign  issues  in  the  next
few  years,  I  put question  marks  on large  areas  in Asia:  Red  China,
where  Mao's  wildly boiling revolution  has  all the earmarks  of break-
ing up  into  blocks  of military  dictatorship  run  by field marshals  who
are  being  supplied with  grain  and  military  hardware  by the U.S.S.R.
If what probably  has already happened in Outer Mongolia  and Shensi
should  occur  elsewhere,  this  would  still  further  strengthen  Soviet
Russia  in  the Far  East.  I  do  not expect  the  political  and  economic
history  of the  next few years  to  be  decided  in Africa.  Latin  America
seems  to  be  approaching  a phase  of  economic  growth  and  stability.
Latest  developments  in  Czechoslovakia  with  the  warning  of  our
President  against  military  invasion  of Rumania  and  the mobilization
of  Yugoslavia's  military  reserves,  indicate  that  the  strategists  of  the
U.S.S.R.  committed  a  tactical  error,  which  possibly  could  work  in
our  favor.  But this remains  to be  seen.
This  sketchy  bird's-eye  view  outlines  the  inescapable  obligations
to  ourselves  and  others,  which  the United  States  fulfills  as  the  lead-
ing  power-substituting  for  the  inability  and  failure  of  the  United
Nations  to enforce  international  law.
From  this tense  situation  I  draw  the following  conclusions:
1.  We  must  give  top  priority  to  keeping  our  nation  politically,
economically,  and militarily  in prime shape  and be  alert to the  shift-
ing risks in  an  explosively  dynamic world.
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national  cooperation  to  let  those  who  try  to  conquer  the  world  de-
stroy  the  faith  of our  allies  and friends  in the  fulfillment  of our com-
mitments.  To let the Soviets build the Berlin  Wall in  1961  and absorb
central  and  eastern  Germany  into  their  satellite  orbit  by  a  new  con-
stitution  in  February  1968  without our  prompt  and  massive  retalia-
tion  are  examples  of what  not  to  do.  Nor  can  we  afford to  lose  face
as  we did in the  sad  case  of the Pueblo.
3.  We must not go into the trap of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty,  which  will be  a  more tragic  error than our untimely  disarma-
ment  after  the Briand-Kellogg  Pact. With  Red China and France  and
also 34 other nations without  nuclear weapons but with nuclear Dower
plants  of  their  own  outside  of  the  treaty,  the  only  result  will  be  a
weakening  of  our  national  defense  and  a greater  defense  burden  on
our federal  budget.
4.  As  a prerequisite  to  considering  any  foreign  policy issues,  it is
mandatory  that  our  nation  use  her  ingenuity,  resourcefulness,  and
social  discipline  to  keep  the  economy  growing  in  productive  assets,
to improve  utilization  of these  assets, and  to remain financially sound.
As the world's  leading  and,  very soon,  only reserve currency,  the dol-
lar must  be  freely  convertible  and  stabilized  in  its  purchasing  power
if  the  nation's  foreign  trade  is  to  prosper.  Inflation  causes  the  most
serious  distortion  of  capital  investment  as  owners  search  for  security
rather  than  interest  earnings.  The  international  prestige  and  diplo-
matic  stature  of the  United  States  are  weakened  if the  budget  of the
government  (federal,  state,  county,  and  town)  shows  increasing  defi-
cits  and  steeply  rising public  debt.
While  the  International  Monetary  Fund has  supported  the dollar
to  help  stave  off  devaluation,  such  action  requires  endorsement  by
representatives  of other  member  nations.  This,  in  turn,  creates  liabil-
ities  in  diplomatic  relations  with  prominent  allied  nations,  such  as
France.
EFFECT  OF  DOMESTIC  PROBLEMS  ON  OUR  FOREIGN  POSITION
From  1958  to  1968  our  general  price  index  has  risen  by  21.2
percent,  but during the  twelve  months  ending  June  30,  1968,  it  rose
by 3.9 percent.
The  results  of hedging  against  inflation  at  a  rate  of  "only"  4  or
4.5 percent  for  the  year plus  internal  migration  toward the  West  are
illustrated  by dry mountain  ranches  in California.  In many instances,
price  per  acre has quadrupled  within three  or four years.  Very often,
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investing  in land  to hedge  against  inflation.
The  value  of  real  estate  in  agriculture,  forestry,  or  recreational
areas  enters  into  the  security  structure  for  a  substantial  part  of  our
banking  and  loan  business.  When  booming  business  activity  slows
down  or  drops  off  sharply,  the  shrinking  of real  estate  prices  could,
and  probably  would  create  again  the  well-known  consequences  of
economic  crisis.
The forces  that  erode  the  purchasing  power  of  the currency  are
competing  pressure  groups,  each  trying  to  get  a  maximal  share  in
benefits  out  of  subsidies  paid  by  the  Treasury.  One  powerful  group
is  labor  unions,  which  no  democratically  governed  country  of  the
world  has yet  subjected  to antitrust laws,  and which perform as  their
members  expect  by  securing  increases  in wage  rates  or fringe  bene-
fits.  That  employees  should  share  in  the  rising  productivity  is  gen-
erally  accepted.  What  undermines  economic  stability,  however,  is
jacking  up  wage  rates  irrespective  of  productivity.  Since  only  some
17  million  of  a  labor  force  of  over  80  million  are  union  members,
the  costs  of  such  actions  are  borne  chiefly  by  the  large  numbers  of
nonunionized  members  of  the  labor  force  through  their  consumer
budgets.
This cost-push  inflation  which  usually  operates  simultaneously  as
demand-pull  inflation,  tends  to weaken  our  economy,  hence our  for-
eign  policy  position.  It  leads  to  oversubstitution  of  capital,  invested
in  labor  saving  devices,  for  skilled  labor.  The  skilled  workers,  no
longer needed,  are  set  free  to bulge  the social  relief rolls  and  stretch
the  budget  of  communities,  counties,  and  states  so  far  beyond  tax
revenues  that  the  deficits  are  being  financed  by  bonds.  The  com-
modity produced  tends to be replaced  by substitutes.  It can  no longer
compete  successfully  in  foreign  markets  or with  imports  in  the  do-
mestic  market.  This,  in turn,  leads  to  various  nontariff forms  of pro-
tectionism  with  subsequent retaliation by the nations concerned  (steel
and  coal  are  the  two  outstanding  examples).  How  far  the  freedom
of  employees  has  been  abrogated  by  monopoly  power  of  unions  is
glaringly  illustrated  by  the  secondary  consumer  boycott  by  Eastern
labor  unions  against  California  grapes,  and  the  threat  of  more boy-
cotts  against other  perishable  crops.
Ever  since  the end  of World War  I we have  pursued  an  agricul-
tural  policy  which  burdens  the  Treasury  with  providing  funds  for  a
great  variety  of  attractive  programs  to  support  farm  incomes.  This
income  support  always  has  had  and  still  has  the  endorsement  of  a
majority  of  the  urban  electorate  as  a means  for  improving  the  level
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sisted  of  fixing  prices  of  commodities  above  equilibrium  levels  by
government  intervention  in  the  domestic  market,  stockpiling  of  the
surpluses,  and  their  liquidation  at  home  and  abroad  at heavy  losses
absorbed  by the U.S.  Treasury.
It  is  an  incontestable  fact that  our  agriculture  in  the 50  states  is
the  world's  most  advanced,  creative,  and  dynamic  system  of  food,
feed,  and  fiber  production,  operating  in  three  million  free-enterprise
units,  competing  in  their  national  common  market,  which  has  200
million  consumers  with  the  highest  per  capita  purchasing  power  of
the  world.  It  pays  the  highest  wages  in  the  world  and  can  compete
in the  world's lowest wage  areas  without subsidy.  This agriculture  has
the  educational,  research,  and technical  assistance  of the unique land-
grant  system  in  production,  marketing,  and  financing.  Furthermore,
it is  organized  in  a  huge  system  of  successful,  well-financed  coopera-
tives,  which  are,  in  every  sense,  modern  business  corporations.  They
give  their  members  effective  bargaining  power  in  buying,  selling,  or
contracting.
Our farms  are  competing  in  the domestic  and  the  export market.
The  world  has  not  approached  anything  like freer international  trade
-in  spite  of exhausting  efforts  under  the  last Kennedy  Round  under
GATT,  which  yielded  deplorably  few  concessions.  But  regional  free
trade  arrangements  have  been  successful  in  removing  quotas,  duties,
and  other obstacles.  The  European  Economic  Community  of  the  Six
and  associated  countries  promises  to  remain  a market  for  U.S.  feed
grain  and oilseeds,  as  may  also the Central  American  Common Mar-
ket  of  Costa  Rica,  Nicaragua,  Honduras,  El  Salvador,  and  Guate-
mala  and possibly  the Latin  American  Free  Trade  Association.  Yet,
there is  every  indication  that, with  declining  rather than rising prices,
competition  for  U.S.  agricultural  exports  will  become  much  keener
than  ever  before.  Hence,  our  commercial  farms  ought  to  be  freed
from  government  price  fixing,  acreage  limitations,  and  income  sub-
sidies.
Today,  there  are  roughly  three  million  farms  comprising  four
different  groups.  Some  800,000  commercial  farm  enterprises,  which
are  rapidly  consolidating  and  shrinking  in  number,  produce  over  90
percent  of  the  market  supply  of  agricultural  commodities.
The  remaining  2.2  million  farms  fall  into  three  entirely  different
groups  with  different  social  and  economic  problems.  One  of  these
groups  is  retirement  farms,  owner-operators  and  families  of  which
have  farm  income  supplemented  by  public  or  private  pensions  or
earnings  on  savings.  They  enjoy the  benefits  of favorable income  tax
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they  leave  to  their  heirs.
The  second  group  are  part-time  farmers  with diversified  incomes.
They  live  on  the  farm,  operating  part  of  the  land,  and  leasing  the
remainder  to  commercial  farms  or letting  the  trees  take  it  back,  but
any  members  of  the  family  in  reach  of  public  or private  transporta-
tion use their manpower  off the farm in remunerative  nonfarming jobs.
The third  group consists  of small income farmers  with  inadequate
skills,  education,  and  managerial  talent.  Located  on poor natural  re-
sources  and equipped  with deficient  man-made  resources,  they  never-
theless  resist migration.
The  social  or  economic  problems  of  the  farm  population  in  the
first  two  groups  are  not  of  emergency  or  top  priority  nature.  The
problems  of  rural  poverty  are  chiefly  those  of  group  three.  While
their  cash  income  is  largely  derived  from  commodities  like  tobacco,
cotton,  peanuts,  or wheat,  their output  is  so small  that  higher  prices
cannot  lift  them  out of their  poverty.
This  problem  besets  all  industrially  advanced  nations.  It  can  be
tackled  only by  gradual  transfer  of the  human resources  of  the small
farms  to  such employment  as  will  provide  adequate  remuneration  in
the  expanding  market  economy.  It  also  requires  shifting  some  land
and  human  resources  into higher  use  such  as  recreational  services  to
urban  people.  Many  of  the  agriculturally  disadvantaged  regions  are
very attractive  to the vacationing  urban  people  and their  young folk.
Modest  but  neat  and  clean  accommodations  on  small  farms  which
provide  meals,  supervised  activities  for children,  or camping trips for
teenagers  are in  prime demand  by citizens  as  well as  foreign tourists.
Shrinkage  in  the  proportion  of  the  labor  force  employed  in  agri-
culture  as  well  as  consolidation  of  farms  into  increasingly  efficient
commercial  agriculture  enterprises  are  accepted  realities  not  only  in
the United  States  but also  in the  United  Kingdom  and the  European
Economic  Community.
OUR  FOREIGN  AID  POLICIES
Since  the  end of  World  War II  the productivity  of labor  in  agri-
culture has  grown  much faster than  in  industry.  In  contrast,  produc-
tivity  of agricultural  labor in  many developing  countries has declined.
This,  in turn,  has  led  our country  and  leading  industrial  countries  of
Europe  to  a policy  of granting overgenerous  financial,  industrial,  and
food  aid  to  developing  countries.  Our  country  has  not  hesitated  to
make research  resources,  up-to-date  technology,  and capital available
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erated  after  the  Korean War  and have  become  more  and more  diver-
sified in  form.  In  the  early  and middle  sixties  doubts  arose  about the
effectiveness  of such  aid and the wisdom  of continuing  it.  Reappraisal
of the  leading  industrial  countries'  policy  of aiding  economic  growth
and  development  in  the  primary  products  exporting  countries  was
slow  and  agonizing  due  partly  to  political  pressure  from  the  United
Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development.  This  organization
of some  86  underdeveloped  countries  pressured  hard  for greater  cap-
ital funds from  the  leading industrial nations. Not only did it stipulate
that  the  acceptable  minimum  net capital  transfer  was  1 percent  per
annum  of the  gross national  product,  but it also  demanded  that these
industrial nations  buy  raw  materials,  food commodities  in particular,
from  developing  countries  at  prices  above  the  world  market  level.
This  demand  was  supported  by  the  claim  that  the  rate  of economic
growth  was  far  less  than what  the people  expected.
During  the  decade  1957-66,  agricultural  production  in  the  less
developed  countries  increased  at  an  average  annual  rate  of  2.5  per-
cent  or  as  much  as  in  the  developed  ones.  However,  per capita food
production  remained  stable  in  the  developing  countries  while  it  in-
creased  in  the  industrial  ones,  due  to  the  higher  rates  of population
growth  as well  as  the  much larger  proportion of young  people  in  the
age  composition  of  the  former.  The  high rate  of  population  growth
was  due  not to  accelerating  birth  rates  but  to  declining  death  rates,
particularly  in tropical  and subtropical  climates,  where malaria,  chol-
era,  yellow  fever,  smallpox,  and  other  infectious  diseases  were  con-
quered.
Whether  measured  by  the  improvement  of  living  conditions  and
per  capita  income  of  the  broad  mass  of  the  rural  population  or  by
the  rate of balanced  and sound economic  growth  in developing  coun-
tries,  the  results  of  foreign  financial  aid  by  the  United  States  and
other  industrial  countries  have  been unsatisfactory--to  put it mildly!
Huge  chunks  of  capital  transferred  under  bilateral  agreements  were
invested  under  the  managerial  control  of government  planning  agen-
cies  of  the  developing  countries.  Mixed  into  the  motives  of  the  de-
cision  makers  in  the  ministries  too often  was  too  much  yearning  for
international  prestige  and  military  status  and  an  unattainable  speed
of industrialization.  Lack  of experience  and lack of professional  com-
petence  in  organizing  newly built  government  operated  industrial  en-
terprises  to meet  the  tough competition  in the commodity markets  of
today's  world  economy  contributed  their  share  in  diminishing  the
flow  of funds  from  the  industrial  countries.  Not  only  were  too  many
of the  new  industrial  plants  unable  to  compete price-wise  or quality-
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in many  instances,  the invested capital  had to be written  off  as  a loss.
One  of  the  most  serious  errors  made  by developing  countries  in
their  use of the  foreign  aid  they received  resulted  from the  misunder-
standing  of  the  role  of  agriculture,  its  auxiliary  village  handicrafts,
and  its  producer  and  consumer  demand  in  economic  development.
This  misconception  contributed  a  great  deal  to  the  lowering  of  the
level  of living  for the  majority  of the  rural  population.
The concentration  of politics in  the metropolitan  areas  and urban
industrial  centers  has  given  the  urban  population  almost  exclusive
priority  to  higher  education,  research,  and  economic  growth.  The
rural  population  has  either  been  excluded  from  progress  or  been
squeezed  between  prices  of  farm  products  fixed  at  low  levels  and
prices  of  farmers'  needs  boosted  up  by  throttled  import  quotas,  du-
ties,  and  high  prices  of products  of the  new  factories.
MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATIONS-AN  ALTERNATIVE  TO
FOREIGN  AID
All  of  these  problems  have  almost  closed  that  phase  of  aid  to
developing  countries  during  the  last  three  years  and  led  to  a  new
development,  which  sails  under  the  emblems  of  "multinational  cor-
poration"  or  "international  agribusiness."
The  initiative  comes  from  successful  business  corporations  in
leading  industrial  countries,  which  have  the  capital,  the "know  how,"
and managerial  skills,  and  are seeking  profitable  investment  in devel-
oping  countries.
This latest  move  at the  frontier  of our foreign  economic  relations
has  quite  a history  of exploration  and experience  by  American  busi-
ness  enterprises  abroad.  Among  a  multitude  of  such  ventures  were
the  investments  by  the  Rockefeller  family  in  Venezuela  from  1937
through  1940  and  those  of  the  American  International  Association
for  Economic  and  Social  Development  (AIA),  a  nonprofit  organ-
ization,  financed  by  individuals  and  companies  in  the United  States
and  Latin  America.  After  concentration  of  its  activities  in  Brazil,
AIA was succeeded  in the latter part of the forties by the International
Basic  Economy  Corporation  with dozens  of  subsidiary  companies  in
Brazil,  Argentina,  Venezuela,  Peru, Colombia,  San  Salvador,  Guate-
mala,  and  finally,  Thailand.
The  multinational  corporations  have  as  partners  one  or  several
private U.S.  business enterprises  and,  say,  one Belgian  and one Japa-
nese company.  But they have  the endorsement,  support,  and coopera-
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with  foreign  affairs,  such  as  the  Agency  for  International  Develop-
ment, the Departments  of Agriculture and Commerce,  and the Export-
Import  Bank.  Such  an  American  enterprise  undertakes  its  foreign
venture  at  its  own  risk, but  it can  obtain government  insurance  for a
part of the  political hazard.
While  annual  U.S.  exports  have  grown  from  $10  billion in  1950
to  $27  billion  in  1965,  the  output  of  U.S.  companies  abroad  has
grown  during the  same period from  $20 billion to $100  billion,  or at
more  than twice  the  rate  of  exports.
Behind  this  remarkable  record  stands  the  experience  of  a  very
large number  of American  companies,  which  have paved  the  way  for
the  multinational  company  approach  to  development  aid  and  agri-
business.  The  basic  principles  are  these:
1.  The  company  must  be  welcomed  by  the  host  country's  gov-
ernment  and  have  the  unequivocal  right  to  manage  its  enter-
prises.
2.  Preferably,  though  not  necessarily,  a  part  of  the  investment
capital  should be  contributed  by reputable  citizens  of the  host
country.
3.  The  company  must  contribute  to  economic  development  be-
sides  the  investment  and  operational  capital,  the  initial  set
of  competent  trained  personnel  as  well  as  its  advanced  tech-
nology  in  order  to train  the  local  people.
4.  The  operation  must  be  profitable  and,  thereby,  create  a  fa-
vorable  investment  climate  and  faith  of  the  people  in  the
stability  of  economic  growth.
5.  The  company  must  have  the privilege  and  right  of  access  to
the  services  of  the  host  country's  public  educational  and  re-
search  system.
6.  The  company  must  have  the  host  country's  guarantee  of  the
right  to  repatriate  or  transfer  abroad  its  earnings  as  well  as,
eventually,  its  capital.
7.  The  company  must  abide  by  the  laws  of  the host  country  as
well  as  those  of  its  own  country  and  countries  of  its  foreign
partners.
What,  then,  is  the  main  difference  between  the  former  develop-
ment  aid  policies,  that  involved  such  exorbitant  losses,  and  the  new
agribusiness  strategy?  The  answer  is  that the  initiative  under the  new
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The  process  of  trial  and  error  does  not  burden  the  state  budget  of
the  host country.  As in  any profit-seeking  and  economically  sensible
enterprise,  each  venture  begins  with  the  exploration  of  the  potential
growth  of effective  demand  for  goods  and  services  by:  (a)  consum-
ers,  (b)  all  links in  the trade chain,  and  (c)  producers  in the market.
The greatest lag  in economic  development  in  less  advanced  coun-
tries  prevails  in the  marketing  of  farm products,  particularly  all  per-
ishable  commodities,  and  the  marketing  of  producer  and  consumer
goods  to  the  farmers.  What  has  been  achieved  in  our  country  from
1917  to  1937,  under  the  leadership  of  the  Extension  Service  of  our
land-grant  colleges,  in  the marketing  of  farm  products  by  the  intro-
duction  of  standards  and  grades  and  the  Pure  Food  and  Drug  Act
is  still  sorely  missing  in  the  majority  of  the  developing  countries.
Grading  and packing  sheds,  warehouses,  transport  facilities  at whole-
sale  and retail  levels are  only  a few  examples  of needed  requisites  for
substantial  improvements  in  prices received  by small  farmers.
ADAPTING  EDUCATION  TO  THE  TASK
Changing  demands  for  the  performance  of  higher  education  in
the  coming  decade  are:
1.  Advancement  of  our  agriculture  to  supply  our  domestic  as
well  as  our  export  needs.
2.  Serving  the  developing  countries  through:
a.  U.S. multinational  corporations.
b.  Direct  consulting  services  to  such countries.
Even  though  the  number  of  our  farms  is  going  to  continue  to
decline,  the demand for academically  trained graduates in agriculture
is  increasing.  At  present,  roughly  67,000  students  are  enrolled  in
agriculture  in land-grant  universities,  including  16,000  graduates.  Of
the latter,  27 percent  went into  graduate  work,  10 percent into farm-
ing,  19  percent  into  agribusiness  and  industry,  10  percent  into  edu-
cation  and  extension,  10  percent  into  federal,  state,  county,  or city
agencies,  and  16  percent  into  the  armed  forces.
This  great  variety  of  promising  opportunities  for  employment  of
the  agriculturally  educated  young  talent  underlines  the  necessity  of
further  continual  adjustment  of  study  and training  programs  offered
in  our  higher  education.  Such  adjustments  ought  to differentiate  be-
tween  skills  and  knowledge  to  be  used  inside  the  U.S.  economy  and
in  other  industrial  countries,  and  skills  and  knowledge  to be  used  in
71developing  countries.  Such  adjustment  is  needed  not only  in studies
and  research  in our  land-grant  college  or  university  system  but  also
in junior colleges,  high schools,  and in the  later grade  school years.
For  work  in our  50  states,  more sophistication  and  specialization
will be required,  including  specific  skills in various spheres  of produc-
tion,  processing,  transportation,  storage,  and  the  utilization  and pro-
cessing  of  agricultural  commodities.
With  reference  to  the  increasing  demand  for  agriculturally  edu-
cated  young  men  and  women  for  performing  constructive  work  in
developing  countries,  too  much  sophistication  may,  in  general,  not
fill  the  gap,  but tend  to  create  new  problems.  This  is particularly  the
case  in quite  a few  countries  where  the  upper and lower  middle  class
in  one  or more  metropolitan  centers  have  adopted  the  latest  design
of  Western  industrial  perfection,  but  where  the  remote  small  family
farms  and  village  craftshops  are  using  tools,  implements,  production
patterns,  and skills of  sixty,  eighty,  or  a  hundred years  ago.
If  the  young  generation  is  to  emerge  from  our  education  with
the  strong  sense  of  realism  so  essential  to their  contributing  to  prog-
ress  in  the  humane  society,  they  ought  to  be  familiar  with  the  con-
crete,  down-to-earth  facts,  such  as  fencing  cattle  in or out by barbed
wire.  It  does  not  serve  the  students  well  to  get chiefly  high  faluting
ideological  interpretations  of all  sorts  of "isms."  They  ought  to know
just  how  raw  and  undeveloped  a  wilderness  this  country  was  and
what the immigrants  from many  countries  brought with them,  includ-
ing concise  images  of what  makes  a farm.  They ought  to  know when
and  how  improved  tools,  implements,  practices,  and  preventives
against  disease  and pestilence  of man  and  animal  appeared  and how,
in  response  to  changing  price-cost  relations  in  the  market,  the  dy-
namic  change  of our  agriculture  never  ceased.
With  over  50,000  foreign  students  enrolled  in  our  colleges  and
universities  (1966),  this  seems  particularly  helpful  to  those  from
less  developed  countries.  Students  ought  to  take  with  them  also  the
conviction  that,  in  any  country,  progress  in  the  agricultural  and food
economy requires the adoption of improved practices,  tools,  and equip-
ment  on  thousands  of  farms,  and  that  many,  many  perceptive  rural
people  will respond  to  opportunities  for change  and education  if they
can  be  motivated  by economic  incentives.  Consumer  goods,  available
at  stable  or  declining  prices  in  the  village  stores  or  co-ops,  or  by
ambulant  trade,  are  most  persuasive  incentives.
In  view  of  the  strategic  importance  of  our  success  in  technical
missions to developing  countries,  I mention  one  of the  delicate weak-
nesses  of  the  past.  Quite  a  few  of  our  experts,  when  called  as  mem-
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made  their  recommendation  on  a  specific  project.  The  package  left
the  recipient  government  in  a  state  of  utter  frustration  because  of
the  absence  of  a  coherent  underlying  set of  economic-social-political
assumptions  and  the  absence  of  alternative  ranks  of  priority  for  ac-
tion.  But  private  organizations  operating  commercial  agricultural
enterprises  in  Latin American  countries  have  frequently  also ignored
recommendations  of  U.S.  experts  that  projects  should  begin  with full
coordination  with  the  governmental  agricultural  research  agencies.
Here  the  frustration  resulted  from  subtleties  of political  psychology.
The world-wide  attempts  at overthrowing  democratic  governments  by
infiltration  and  guerilla  tactics,  and  the  usual  temporary  suspension
of civil liberties  by  a military  regime,  have  naturally  led  to  defensive
behavior  by  the  managers  of  farm  enterprises  in  many  developing
countries.  They  have  no  desire  to  depend  entirely  on  an  extension
service  run by a college  of agriculture,  controlled by the government.
If,  by  a  coup  d'etat,  the  government  is  taken  over by  Communists,
then  all  farm  enterprises  are  government  managed  the  next  day.  If  a
military junta  steps  in,  the same  may  occur.
CONCLUSIONS
Our  economy  and  our  population  will  continue  to  grow  at  such
a  rate  that  only  the  utmost  self-discipline,  enforcement  of  law  and
order,  and  adherence  to  the  few  incontestable  values,  on  which  our
constitution  stands,  will  keep  us  in  the position  of the  leading power.
I  see  no  reason  to  expect  in  the  noncommunistic  parts  of  the
world  starvation,  an  overpopulation  crisis,  or  other  disasters.  How-
ever,  in our own metropolitan  and urban areas,  we have  a great num-
ber  of  social,  economic.  political,  and  juridical  problems,  which  re-
quire  dogged  persistence  and  concentration  in  tackling  them  and
reasonableness  of  expectations  of  the  citizens  in  solving  them.  If we
do  not  follow  blindly  certain  overarticulate  intellectual  geniuses  in
universities,  who  claim  to  know  precisely  what  is  good  for  all  other
people,  and  rely  instead  on  the  good  common  sense,  self-discipline,
and  efforts  of  the  average  citizens  who  made  this  country,  we  shall
avoid  becoming  victims  of  arrogant  despotism.  Being  challenged  by
actual  or  potential  tyranny  from  abroad  and  inside  our boundaries,
we  shall, I believe,  prevail  as  a humane  society that respects  and pro-
tects  human dignity.
Winding  up  the  appraisal  of  the  role  of  our  country  in  tomor-
row's  world  affairs,  I want  to  remove  from  the  stage  the least  prob-
able  events:
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shals  to  establish  peaceful  relations  with  the  nations  of  the  Organ-
ization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  to  agree  on
any  true  disarmament,  or  to  halt  the  race  toward  naval  supremacy
around the East and West of the  Eurasian  continent.  It seems  equally
improbable  that  Soviet  Russia  will begin  any major  military  aggres-
sion  against  Western  Europe,  Japan,  or  in  the Western  Hemisphere
if  and  so  long  as  we  and  our  allies  remain  militarily  prepared  and
alert  and  our  diplomats  and  our  intelligence  are  aware  of  Soviet
strategy  and  tactics  in  all  dimensions.
If  we  do  not  play  ostrich  by  hypnotizing  ourselves  into  the  sui-
cidal  assumption  that  peaceful  coexistence  is  well  on  its  way,  the
prospects  seem  to  be good for more effective  economic,  cultural,  and
social  cooperation  between  industrial  nations  under  our  leadership
and  developing  countries.
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